08/16/2006

Perry Metzger is a chemistry student at college. Last week he wrote a rather insightful message to a friend of his regarding the “liquid terrorist” threat, and it’s been spread around the internet. It’s rather long, so I’ll quote parts of it here.

Based on the claims in the media, it sounds like the idea was to mix H2O2 (hydrogen peroxide, but not the low test kind you get at the pharmacy), H2SO4 (sulfuric acid, of necessity very concentrated for it to work at all), and acetone (known to people worldwide as nail polish remover), to make acetone peroxides. You first have to mix the H2O2 and H2SO4 to get a powerful oxidizer, and then you use it on acetone to get the peroxides, which are indeed explosive.

A mix of H2O2 and H2SO4, commonly called “piranha bath”, is used in orgo labs around the world for cleaning the last traces out of organic material out of glassware when you need it really clean– thus, many people who work around organic labs are familiar with it. When you mix it, it heats like mad, which is a common thing when you mix concentrated sulfuric acid with anything. It is very easy to end up with a spattering mess. You don’t want to be around the stuff in general.

Now you may protest “but terrorists who are willing to commit suicide aren’t going to be deterred by being injured while mixing their precursor chemicals!”– but of course, determination isn’t the issue here; getting the thing done well enough to make the plane go boom is the issue. There is also the small matter of explaining to the guy next to you what you’re doing, or doing it in a tiny airplane bathroom while the plane jitters about.

On an airplane, the whole thing is ridiculous. You have nothing to cool the mixture with. You have nothing to control your mixing with. You can’t take a day doing the work, either. You are probably locked in the tiny, shaking bathroom with very limited ventilation, and that isn’t going to bode well for you living long enough to get your explosives manufactured. In short, it sounds, well, not like a very good idea.

The news this morning was full of stuff about “ordinary looking devices being used as detonators”. Well, if you’re using nasty unstable peroxides as your explosive material, you don’t really need any– the stuff goes off if you give it a dirty look. I suspect a good hard rap with a hard heavy object would be more than sufficient. No need to worry about those cell phones secretly being high tech “detonators” if you’re going this route.

There are other open questions I have here as well. Assuming this is really what was planned, why are the airport security making people throw away their shampoo? If you open a shampoo bottle and give it a sniff, I assure you that you’ll notice concentrated sulfuric acid very fast, not that you would want to have your nose near it for long. No high tech means needed for detection there. Acetone is also pretty distinctive– the average airport security person will recognize the smell of nail polish remover if told that is what they’re sniffing for.

We’re stopping people from bringing on board wet things. What about dry things? Is baby powder safe? Well, perhaps it is if you check carefully that it is, in fact, baby powder. What if, though, it is mostly a container of potassium cyanide and a molar equivalent of a dry carboxylic acid? Just add water in the first class bathroom, and LOTS of hydrogen cyanide gas will evolve.

See the elderly gentleman with the cane? Perhaps it is not really an ordinary cane. The metal parts could be filled with (possibly sintered) aluminum and iron oxide. Thermite! Worse still, nothing in a detector will notice thermite, and trying to make a detector to find thermite is impractical. Maybe it is in the hollowed portions of your luggage handles! Maybe it is cleverly mixed into the metal in someone’s wheelchair! Who knows?

Also, we can never allow people to bring on laptop computers. It is far too easy to fill the interstices of the things with explosives– there is a lot of space inside them– or to rig the lithium ion batteries to start a very hot fire (that’s pretty trivial).

Then, lets consider books and magazines. Sure, they look innocent, but are they? For 150 years, chemists have known that if you take something with high cellulose content– cotton, or paper, or lots of other things– and you nitrate it (usually with a mixture of nitric and sulfuric acids), you get nitrocellulose, which looks vaguely like the original material you nitrated but which goes BOOM nicely. So, naturally, we have to get rid of books and magazines on board. That’s probably for the best, as people who read are dangerous.

Now, books aren’t the only things you could nitrate. Pants and shirts? Sure. It might take a lot of effort to get things just so or they will look wrong to the eye, but I bet you can do it. Clearly, we can’t allow people on planes wearing clothes. Nudity in the air will doubtless be welcomed by many as an icebreaker, having been deprived of their computers and all reading material for entertainment.

It isn’t entirely clear that even body cavity searches would be enough. If we’re looking for a movie plot, why not just get a sympathetic surgeon to implant explosives into your abdomen! A small device that looks just like a pace maker could be the detonator, and with modern methods, you could do something like setting it off by rapping “shave and a haircut” on your own chest. You could really do this– and I’d like to see them catch that one.

So can someone tell me where the madness is going to end? My back of the envelope says about as many people die in the US every month in highway accidents than have died in all our domestic terrorist incidents in the last fifty years. At some point, we’re going to have to accept that there is a difference between real security and “security theater”, and a difference between realistic threats and uninteresting threats. I’m happy that the police caught these folks even if their plot seems very sketchy, but could we please have some sense of proportion?

08/15/2006

From the Department of Homeland Insecurity’s Systems Engineering Study of Civil Aviation Security:

… X-ray images do not provide the information necessary to effect detection of explosives.

Naturally, since the study concludes that it’s difficult or impossible to detect explosives inside someone’s shoe, the Department just made it mandatory to remove your shoes and pass them through the x-ray machine.

Ooh, the logic. Head… hurts…

08/14/2006

Now that the so-called “liquid terrorists” (who came up with that description?) have been foiled, it must be time to increase our security measures yet again. Never mind that almost all forms of liquid– as well as common carry-on items like laptops, cameras, and iPods– are now banned from airline flights. That’s not enough, oh no.

Secretary of Homeland Insecurity Chertoff said this:

What helped the British in this case is the ability to be nimble, to be fast, to be flexible, to operate based on fast-moving information. We have to make sure our legal system allows us to do that. It’s not like the Twentieth Century, where you had time to get warrants.

Warrants, ha ha! That’s so antiquated, so “Twentieth Century”. Who needs ’em?

Never mind that the British intelligence service had been following these guys for almost a year, and only (grudgingly) made the sting last week at the insistence of the Bush administration. Chertoff’s assertion that they were “nimble” makes it seem like they received a tip and immediately scrambled the Harriers or something. Not true.

It’s also worth mentioning that the British obtained warrants for their work, are required by law to do so, and unlike their American counterparts, don’t seem to feel the need to flaunt the law and go behind the curtain to do their dirty work. And yet… somehow… they were still able to apprehend these terrorists… within the bounds of the law.

For Chertoff, Bush, Gonzales, and the rest of the jolly crew to continue insisting that the federal government requires more latitude, less oversight, and no warrants is nothing short of an obvious abuse of power at this point. The British have shown us how it can be done… and to use their long, hard work as an example of why we should ignore the laws is insulting.

08/13/2006

Bruce Schneier, a widely-read and respected author who writes lately about terrorism and related security issues, put together an excellent condemnation of the recent ban of all liquids from airline flights. I’ll quote a portion of his op-ed piece:

None of the airplane security measures implemented because of 9/11– no-fly lists, secondary screening, prohibitions against pocket knives and corkscrews– had anything to do with last week’s arrests. And they wouldn’t have prevented the planned attacks, had the terrorists not been arrested. A national ID card wouldn’t have made a difference, either.

Instead, the arrests are a victory for old-fashioned intelligence and investigation. Details are still secret, but police in at least two countries were watching the terrorists for a long time. They followed leads, figured out who was talking to whom, and slowly pieced together both the network and the plot.

The new airplane security measures focus on that plot… but only temporarily. Banning box cutters since 9/11, or taking off our shoes since Richard Reid, has not made us any safer. And a long-term prohibition against liquid carry-ons won’t make us safer, either. It’s not just that there are ways around the rules, it’s that focusing on tactics is a losing proposition.

It’s easy to defend against what the terrorists planned last time, but it’s short-sighted. If we spend billions fielding liquid-analysis machines in airports and the terrorists use solid explosives, we’ve wasted our money. If they target shopping malls, we’ve wasted our money. Focusing on tactics simply forces the terrorists to make a minor modification in their plans. There are too many targets– stadiums, schools, theaters, churches, the long line of densely packed people before airport security– and too many ways to kill people.

Security measures that require us to guess correctly don’t work, because invariably we will guess wrong. It’s not security, it’s security theater: measures designed to make us feel safer but not actually safer.

This is what I’ve been saying for years, and is really the fundamental problem with the way our government– and, indeed, many of our citizens– view the terrorist threat. Security and the appearance of security are completely different things. We seem to have a lot of appearances, but very little real additional security.

08/13/2006

The Department of Homeland Insecurity has actually declared an entire state of matter to be a national security risk.

Here’s a simple diagram to assist those who may be flying sometime soon– to ensure only the proper types of matter are brought aboard the airplane.

I predict that the next terr’ist plot will involve some quantity of solid matter, and from there it will only be a matter of time before solids are banned from airline flights as well. When will the madness end?

08/12/2006

Ted Stevens continues to get hammered (and rightfully so) for his awful portrayal of the internet as “a series of tubes”. You can buy everything from t-shirts to coffee mugs containing his catch phrase, and now I saw a hilarious “404 page”, which is what you see when the web server can’t find the page your browser has requested:

The tubes have been filled
The page you are looking for is temporarily unavailable. Someone has put into the tubes enormous amounts of material, enormous amounts of material.

Please try the following:

  • Click the Unclog button, or try again later.
  • Make sure that the web site address displayed in the address bar of your browser is spelled and formatted correctly, including all stutters.
  • What has happened to your personal internet? If your staff sent you an internet Friday, you got it yesterday. Why?
  • The internet is not a big truck; Windows can check your Tube Connection Settings to make sure that your computer is set to put your message into the tubes, and not to dump.
  • Click the Back button to try another tube.

Full tubes or big truck error.